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282 RISKIN v. TOWERS [24 C.2d 
notice, the motion would be based upon it, the affidavit of 
merits made by him, the proposed verified answer, "and 
upon all the other records and files in the above entitled 
cause." In a counter affidavit, Sydney M. Williams, counsel 
for the respondent, declared that on January 13, 1942, he 
saw Towers served with the summons and complaint. In this 
affidavit, Williams also stated facts tending to prove that 
Towers had full knowledge of all of the steps taken in the 
action being prosecuted against him and that he had not in 
good faith proceeded in such a manner as to be entitled to 
relief under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
It is significant that the notice of motion does not state, 
as one of its grounds, that 'rowers had not been served with 
process, but only that he "believed" no service had been 
made upon him. Nor did he present any affidavit in this re-
gard. True, he said that the motion would be based upon all 
the records and files in the action. But assuming that, by 
such reference, the affidavits presented to the court in con-
nection with the motion to set aside the service were a part 
of the evidence which the court was entitled to and did con-
sider in ruling upon the motion to set aside the default, they 
only added more directly contradictory statements concern-
ing the asserted occurrences on January 13, 1942, when it is 
claimed that Towers was served. Moreover, the records and 
files include a minute order reciting that the prior motion 
was heard upon the testimony of Towers, his wife, and Wil-
liams, and was denied. 
To me, the conclusion is inescapable that upon the motion 
to set aside the default and permit the answer of Towers to 
be filed, the trial judge was required to determine, upon the 
evidence then submitted to him, an issue of fact and that 
his order, based upon conflicting evidence, is beyond the 
reach of an appellate court. For these reasons, in my opinion, 
the order should be affirmed. 
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LESLIE F. McGREGOR, Petitioner, V. THE STATE BAR 
OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent. 
[la-lc] Attorneys-Disbarment-Moral Turpitude.-An attorney 
was disbarred where the evidence showed that he permitted a 
lay employee to use his name as attorney in operating a collec-
tion agency, and that money paid on a note was misappro-
priated, and where the misconduct, in part coincident with and 
also extending beyond the period covered by a prior proceeding 
resulting in a suspension, disclosed lack of improvement in 
appreciation of the ethical standards of the profession. 
[2] Id._Disbarment-Mitigating Circumstances.-An attorney is 
not entitled to any indulgence by reason of his restitution of 
moneys wrongfully retained, especially where made as a mat-
ter of expediency and under pressure. 
[3] Id. _ Disbarment - Evidence-Prior Record.-In disbarment 
proceedings, a prior suspension of the attorney proceeded 
against is a proper matter for consideration. 
PROCEEDING to review recommendation of disbarment. 
Petitioner disbarred. 
Leslie F. McGregor, in pro. per., for Petitioner. 
Sam J. Anderson and Jerold E. Weil for Respondent. 
THE COURT.-This is a proceeding to review the findings 
and the recommendation of the Board of Governors of The 
State Bar of California that the petitioner be disbarred from 
the practice of the law in all the courts of this state. 
By an amended notice to show cause the petitioner was 
charged with the violation of his oath and duties as an attor-
ney and with the commission of acts involving moral turpi-
tude and dishonesty (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6067, 6068, 6103, 
6106) ; and, in particular, with .the violation of section 6105 
of said code (lending his name to be used as an attorney by 
another person who is not an attorney) and Rule 9 of the 
[1] See 9 Ca1.Jur. Ten-year SUPP· 423; 1) Am.Jur. 428. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Attorneys at Law, § 141; [2] Attor" 
neys at Law, § 151; [3] Attorneys at Law, § 172(9). 
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Rules of Professional Conduct (commingling money belong-
ing to clients with his own funds and failing to report prompt-
ly the receipt of money belonging to them, 213 Cal. cxv.) 
The petitioner made written answer to these charges but did 
not appear either in person or by counsel at any of the three 
hearings held in this disciplinary matter before the appointed 
local administrative committee, and at which the complain-
ing witnesses and the petitioner's implicated employee testi-
fied. From the evidence so before it the committee made find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law adverse to the petitioner 
and recommended that he be disbarred. Thereafter the peti-
tioner was notified of his prIvilege to appear before the Board 
of Governors for oral argument of his case, but he did not 
attend the meeting scheduled for the consideration of his mat-
ter or otherwise communicate with the board. Thereupon, 
after full discussion of the record, the board adopted, with 
slight modification, the findings of fact made by the local 
administrative committee and, by a vote of twelve to two, ap-
proved the recommendation of the petitioner's disbarment. 
In so fixing the degree of discipline, the board took into con-
sideration that another disciplinary matter against the peti-
tioner, likewise concerning contested issues of moral turpitude 
and dishonesty in connection with charges of his infraction 
of Rule 9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, was pending 
before The State Bar and upon which hearings had been held 
by a local administrative committee at the time that the al-
leged misconduct involved in the present proceeding took 
place. In said prior matter the board recommended a sus-
pension of ninety days, the petitioner did not seek a review 
in this court, and accordingly he was suspended from the 
practice of the law for the mentioned period by order of this 
court dated March 1, 1943 (In re Suspension of McGregor, 
Bar Misc. 1749), some six months before the board's recom-
mendation of disbarment in the present proceeding. 
Upon this application for review the petitioner advances 
two arguments: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence to sus-
tain the determination of the board; and (2) the impropriety 
of its reference to his past record of suspension in fixing the 
measure of discipline herein. 
[la] In the findings, as modified, the facts involved in the 
present proceeding are recited substantially as follows: For 
some time prior to February, 1942, and for several months 
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thereafter, the petitioner maintained his law office and a col-
lection agency at the same location in San Francisco. To as~ 
sist him in his business, the petitioner employed one Peter 
Lorenzo, who was not a member of the bar but who was given 
wide authority in the performance of his duties and allowed 
to use the petitioner's name as an attorney at law in carrying 
on correspondence and acknowledging receipts of money in 
connection with the conduct of the collection agency. The 
latter activity appeared to be so interwoven with the peti-
tioner's legal business that it was difficult to distinguish be-
tween the two in the allocation of services rendered; how-
ever, Lorenzo was paid by the petitioner from his own fundfl, 
and not by the collection agency as a separate entity. ' 
Sometime in February, 1942, one Harry Pickering called 
at the office of the petitioner for the purpose or employiilg 
him to collect the balance of $55 due on a promissory ilote 
made in favor of Pickering and his wife. Pickering was seek~ 
ing the services of an attorney and not of a collection agency. 
He was interviewed by a man in the office whom he believed 
to be the petitioner, but who answered the description of Lo-
renzo; and it was then agreed between the two that the fee 
would be contingent upon the successful completion of the 
undertaking and in such event, would be one-half of the col~ 
lection. Thereafter two progress reports written on the pe-
titioner's letterhead-one dated February 25, 1942, and the 
other July 15, 1942-each bearing the petitioner's signature 
and setting forth the efforts being made to locate the debtor, 
were sent to Pickering. Lorenzo admitted having signed the 
petitioner's name to these reports and stated that on many 
other occasions he had followed the same practice with respect 
to communications written on the petitioner's legal stationery; 
Subsequent to the date last above mentioned the debtor under 
the note called at the. petitioner's office on various occasions, 
paid the $55 balance in the course of several installments 
(August-October 10, 1942), and was given corresponding re-
ceipts therefor, each bearing the rubber stamp signature of 
the petitioner and none revealing any connection with the 
collection agency., Lorenzo stated that he placed the rubber 
stamp signature on the receipts in accordance with his custo-
:mary procedure in handling such matters for the. petitioner: 
Neither the petitioner nor Lorenzo made any accounting to 
thePickerings with respect to the collection of the $55, or any 
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part thereof; no part of said sum was ever paid to them; but 
admittedly without the consent of the Pickerings, the whole 
amount was commingled with the petitioner's funds and ap-
propriated to his use and benefit. The Pickerings did not 
learn of the collection of the $55, or any part of it, until Octo-
ber 10, 1942, the date of the final payment, when the debtor 
advised them of the fulfillment of his obligation. 
Turning to the record in this matter and, in the review 
thereof, according to the petitioner every favorable inference 
and intendment, the conclusion is inescapable that he has not 
met the burden of showing that the findings of the board, as 
above summarized, are erroneous or unsupported by the evi-
dence. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6083.) The adverse determina-
tion of the factual issue as to whether the petitioner permitted 
his employee, Lorenzo, a layman, to use his name as an at-
torney at law in the operation of the collection agency is in 
direct line with the positive testimony adduced at the hear·· 
ings in this matter. Thus, after observing that the petition-
er's collection business and legal affairs were so intermingled 
that it was difficult to distinguish them as regards the rendi-
tion of services, Lorenzo stated that in the regular perform-
ance of his duties in the management of the petitioner's office 
he was authorized to interview clients and fix fees, write let-
ters on the petitioner's legal stationery, sign the latter's name 
to the communications, and acknowledge moneys collected on 
claims by appropriate receipts bearing the petitioner's rubber 
stamp signature. In particular as here involved, Lorenzo 
identified the above-mentioned two progress reports addressed 
to the Pickerings in February and July, 1942, and the receipts 
given to the debtor under the Pickering note as typical of his 
authorized use of the petitioner's name in business transac-
tions concerning the affairs of clients with the office. Picker-
ing testified that when he entered the petitioner's office seek-
ing the services of an attorney, he was interviewed by a man 
answering the description of Lorenzo but who, from the tenor 
of their discussion fixing the fee arrangements in connection 
with the collection matter, Pickering assumed was the peti-
tioner. Lorenzo admitted Pickering's description andre-
called, though vaguely in view of the lapse of time and the 
many similar matters he handled in the interim, the circum-
stances of the particular interview. 
While the petitioner claims that he instructed Lorenzo to 
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"close out" the collection business in the early part of 1942, a 
procedure which, according to the petitioner, would require 
several months to complete, Lorenzo emphatically denied that 
he had been so directed and maintaIned that he, as a trusted 
employee and during the petitioner's absence, only continued 
to manage the latter's office in the same manner as he had for 
some years previously. It appears that in the year 1942 the 
petitioner, by reason of his employment in a defense plant, 
was absent from his office a considerable portion of each day, 
frequently not going there until late in the afternoon or eve-
ning; yet, according to Lorenzo, the petitioner in his daily 
visits was maintaining an active contact with his business and 
was, in fact, "conducting" it when Lorenzo left the petition-
er's employ in October of that year to do government work. 
Thus, Lorenzo testified that all moneys collected by him in 
the petitlOner's absence were placed in a cashbox and called 
to the petitioner's attention on his return; that if he, Lorenzo, 
left the office when the petitioner was not there, he always 
would leave a note informing the petitioner of what had tran-
spired in his absence, including a reference to any collections 
which might be found in the cashbox; and that the petitioner 
customarily took care of all bank deposits himself. 
That there is no evidence that the petitioner ever heard of 
or dealt with the Pickering matter is of no consequence here. 
What is important under the circumstances is the fact that 
it can readily be inferred from the record that Lorenzo repre-
sented himself as the petitioner in all his dealings with the 
Pickerings and that he was authorized to do so as part of the 
regular performance of his office duties; and the petitioner 
admits, in his application for review by this court, that the 
"ultimate responsibility of the (Pickering) case would be" 
his. 
With respect to the issue of the petitioner's improper re-
tention of funds belonging to the Pickerings as the result of 
the installment payments by the debtor under their note, the 
evidence is indisputably unfavorable to the petitioner. The 
two progress reports of February and July, 1942, as above 
mentioned, simply recited efforts of the petitioner's office to 
locate the debtor; the subsequent collection of the moneys due 
on the not0 apparently were never communicated by Lorenzo 
or the petitioner to the Pickerings, who first learned of the 
payments from the debtor on the day the last one was made, 
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October 10, 1942. The receipts for the respective sums 
credited against the note-exhibits in the record-conclusively 
establish, of course, that the full $55 balance was paid into 
the petitioner's office. Although in his answer filed in this 
disciplinary proceedings, the petitioner averred that he "has 
ascertained that the money is due the said Pickerings and 
has caused to be issued a remittance to them," no evidence 
of such reimbursement was offered by him or in his behalf at 
the hearings before the local administrative committee or the 
Board of Governors. [2] But even were the petitioner's 
allegation conceded to be the fact, the restitution of moneys 
wrongfully retained, especially where made as a matter of 
expediency and under pressure, does not entitle an attorney 
to any indulgence. (Maggart v. State Bar, 7 Cal.2d 495 [61 
P.2d 451]; Narlian v. State Bar, 21 Ca1.2d 876 [136 P.2d 
553]. ) 
[lb] There is no legal justification for the petitioner's 
misconduct as thus charged and found upon compelling evi-
dence. His method of doing business in the manner depicted, 
indicating a lack of those qualities essential to the mainte-
nance of the dignity and integrity of the profession and the 
protection of the public, comes within the definition of "moral 
turpitude" as the term 1S used in bar matters. As was said 
in Townsend v. State Bar, 210 Cal. 362, 364 [291 P. 837] : 
"The right to practice law not only presupposes in its pos-
sessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the 
exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking 
of the nature of a public trust. It is manifest that the powers 
and privileges derived from it may not with propriety be 
delegated to or exercised by a nonlicensed person." More-
over, as noted by the Board of Governors in its recommenda-
tion to this court, the misconduct subject of the present pro-
ceeding covered a period in part coincident with, and also 
extending beyond, the hearing of another disciplinary charge 
against the petitioner by a local administrative committee of 
The State Bar. Such prior matter, involving considerations 
of "moral turpitude" in connection with an objectionable 
accounting practice, terminated adversely for the petitioner; 
he did not challenge the consequent disciplinary recommen-
dation of the Board of Governors; and finality was reached 
therein upon the order of this court in March, 1943, suspend-
ing him from practice for ninety days. (In re Suspension of 
-..,."..'.-=-----~-,~--------
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McGregor, Bar Misc. 1749, supra.) [3] As so concluded 
some six months prior to the board's determination of the 
present proceeding, the prior suspension was an appopriate 
consideration herein. (Mills v. State Bar, 6 Ca1.2d 565, 567 
[58 P.2d 1273] ; Dudney v. State Bar, 8 Ca1.2d 555, 562-563 
[66 P.2d 1199] ; Petersen v. State Bar, 21 Ca1.2d 866, 871 [136 
P .2d 561].) [lc] I ts particular significance here rests upon 
the fact that the petitioner, while undergoing investigation for 
the act of dishonesty there involved and subsequently estab-
lished, committed still further acts of a similar nature. It is 
apparent therefrom that the disciplinary considerations in-
herent in the prior charge did not improve the petitioner's 
appreciation of the ethical standards of the profession or im-
press him with his responsibilities in handling the affairs of 
clients. The State Bar Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, chap. 4) is 
designed to provide a procedure whereby those attorneys at 
law who prove recreant to their trust may be removed from 
the practice. As was said in Dudney v. State Bar, supra, at 
page 563: "The purpose of disbarment proceedings is not to 
punish the individual but to determine whether the attorney 
should continue in that capacity." These considerations in 
conjunction with the facts in the present proceeding as dis-
closed by the record herein fully justified the action and de-
termination of the board. 
It is ordered that the petitioner be disbarred from the prac-
tice of law in all of the courts of this state and that his name 
be stricken from the roll of attorneys, this order to be effec-
tive thirty days from the filing of this decision. 
24 ::.2<>-10 
